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In the first place, this article is concerned chiefly with the limits of the UN as an organization. In the second place, the words " essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States" refer to those matters that are not regulated by international law. As the ICJ has concluded, "[T]he question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international relations.

Sovereignty has been eroded by contemporary economic, cultural, and environmental factors. Interference in what would previously have been regarded as internal affairs — by other states, the private sector, and nonstate actors — has become routine. However, the preoccupation here is not these routine matters but the potential tension when the norm of state sovereignty and egregious human suffering coexist. As Kofi Annan suggested, in his opening remarks at the General Assembly, "States bent on criminal behaviour [should] know that frontiers are not the absolute defence.

The limits on sovereignty discussed above are widely accepted. They originate in the Charter itself, in authoritative legal interpretations of that document, and in the broader body of international law that has been agreed on by states. In recent decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, four more radical challenges to the notion of state sovereignty have emerged: continuing demands for self-determination, a broadened conception of international peace and security, the collapse of state authority, and the increasing importance of popular sovereignty.

In many ways, a central contemporary difficulty arises from the softening of two norms that had been virtually unchallenged during the Cold War, the sanctity of borders and the illegitimacy of secession. For almost half a century, collective self-determination was limited to the initial process of decolonization. Existing borders were sacrosanct, and it was unthinkable that an area of a state would secede, even with the consent of the original state.

The OAU's Charter was clear that colonial borders, although it is generally agreed that they were arbitrarily drawn, still had to be respected, or chaos would ensue. Uti possidetis, ita possideatis as you possess, so may you possess was accepted as the necessary trade-off for a modicum of international order.

At the end of the Cold War, however, these relatively clear waters became muddied. First, the Soviet Union became a "former superpower. Shortly thereafter, Yugoslavia broke up into 6 independent states. Later in the decade, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia. That weakening of the norms relating to borders and secessions is creating new tensions. Contemporary politics in developing countries is deeply conditioned by the legacy of colonialism. As European states ruled so many Asian and African countries without their consent, respect for state sovereignty is the preemptive norm par excellence of ex-colonial states.

In light of history, it is difficult for representatives of developing countries to take at face value altruistic claims by the West. What may appear as narrow legalism — for instance, that Security Council authorization is a prerequisite for intervention — often appears in the South as a necessary buttress against new forms of imperialism. The second challenge is the broadening interpretation of threats to international peace and security, the Charter-enshrined licence to override the principle of nonintervention.

It arises from the fact that the Charter's collective system of international peace and security was crafted on the experience of the Second World War, some of which is of doubtful contemporary relevance. The focus was principally on the external unlawful use of sovereignty by states in committing acts of aggression. Collective efforts by the UN to deal with internal problems of peace and security, and gross violations of human rights, including genocide, have therefore run against the grain of the claim to sovereign status as set out in the Charter.

State actions approved or authorized after the Cold War's end by the Security Council have routinely broadened the notion of what is considered a threat to international peace and security. This process actually began during the Cold War with the Security Council's coercive decisions in the form of economic sanctions and arms and oil embargoes against apartheid in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

In both cases, the Security Council described the recourse to Chapter VII action as a response to "threats to international peace and security. An affront to civilization was packaged as a threat to international peace and security in order to permit action. The evolution of the definition of a threat to international peace and security accelerated in the s. For instance, while recalling Article 2 7 of the Charter, the Security Council, in Resolution , nonetheless condemned "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas.

It has reaffirmed that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols are individually responsible in respect of such breaches. The main interventions of the s were justified, at least in part, on humanitarian grounds, though again the humanitarian dimensions were framed as threats to international peace and security. In most cases, the dire humanitarian situation was explicitly mentioned in the Security Council's authorization — the most extreme case being Somalia, where "humanitarian" appeared 18 times in Resolution In short, the range of interpretations of international peace and security — the concept that defines the Security Council's mandate — has been substantially broadened, albeit not without controversy.

The third challenge to traditional interpretations of state sovereignty has arisen because of the incapacity of certain states to effectively exercise authority over their territories and populations. In some cases, sovereignty is a legal fiction not matched by an actual political capacity.

They are, in the words of one analyst, "quasi-states. Some commentators have even argued that failed states violate the substantive UN membership requirement in Charter Article 4 that they "are able to carry out" their obligations. This perspective is important in light of the growing awareness that state capacity and authority are essential conditions for the protection of fundamental rights.

These conditions do not invoke nostalgia for repressive national-security states, but they recognize that a modicum of state authority and capacity is a prerequisite for the maintenance of domestic and international order and justice. The absence or disappearance of a functioning government can lead to the same kinds of human catastrophe as the presence of a repressive state or the outbreak of a deadly civil war. Resounding features of these so-called failed states are anarchy, chronic disorder, and civil war waged without regard for the laws of armed conflict.

These features, individually or collectively, inhibit or prevent a state from acting with authority over its entire territory. The failure of state sovereignty is most obviously evidenced by the lack of control where territorial sovereignty is effectively contested by force internally. In this situation, insurgents may occupy and control large portions of the territory, inhibiting the state from carrying out its responsibility to protect lives and property and maintain public security.

The political vacuum resulting from these circumstances leads to nonstate actors' taking matters into their own hands, the massive flight of refugees, and the forced displacement of populations. These issues also create consequences of concern to other states, international organizations, and civil society. In lending support to the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, Zimbabwe went so far as to take the position that "when there is no government in being and there is just chaos in the country," domestic affairs should be qualified as meaning "affairs within a peaceful environment.

The grave humanitarian consequences of the failure of state capacity has led the Security Council to override state sovereignty by determining that internal disorder may pose a threat to international peace and security. In one case in particular, Somalia, the complete absence of state capacity prompted the Security Council to authorize a Chapter VII intervention.

The fourth challenge to traditional state sovereignty emerges from the changing balance between states and people as the source of legitimacy and authority. The older version of the rule of the law of states is being tempered by the rule of law based on the rights of individuals. And a broader concept of sovereignty, encompassing both the rights and the responsibilities of states, is now being more widely advocated. One formulation has been proposed by Kofi Annan in his widely cited article in The Economist on the "two concepts of sovereignty," which helped launch the intense debate on the legitimacy of intervention on humanitarian grounds.

In it he argued that one concept of sovereignty is oriented around states and the other around people:. State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined — not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty — by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties — has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.

When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. For Annan and others, sovereignty is not becoming less relevant; it remains the ordering principle of international affairs.

However, "it is the peoples' sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty. Another way of approaching the increasing importance of popular sovereignty is the notion of "sovereignty as responsibility," most explicitly formulated by Francis M. This doctrine stipulates that when states are unable to provide life-supporting protection and assistance for their citizens, they are expected to request and accept outside offers of aid.

Sovereignty then means accountability to two separate constituencies: internally, to one's own population; and internationally, to the community of responsible states and in the form of compliance with human rights and humanitarian agreements.

Proponents of this view argue that sovereignty is not absolute but contingent. When a government massively abuses the fundamental rights of its citizens, its sovereignty is temporarily suspended. A third variant on this theme revolves around the concept of human security. Security has traditionally been conceived in terms of the relations between states, but for a growing number of states the security of individuals is becoming a foreign policy priority in its own right.

According to a group of states participating in the Human Security Network, "[H]uman security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. In the face of repressive or weak states, advocates of human security argue that international actors have a responsibility to come to the aid of populations at risk.

Ultimately, "peace and security — national, regional and international — are possible only if they are derived from peoples' security. These approaches all see the basis for sovereignty shifting from the absolute rights of state leaders to respect for the popular will and internal forms of governance based on international standards of democracy and human rights. Some observers charge that humanitarian intervention is simply the latest phase of Eurocentric domination.

Human rights are the contemporary Western values being imposed in place of Christianity and the "standard of civilization" 24 in the 19th and early 20th century. Nevertheless, from many quarters the view is emerging that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct. William Zartman, ed. The debate began in earnest following Gerald B. Damrosch, ed. Intervention means various forms of nonconsensual action that are often thought to directly challenge the principle of state sovereignty.

With the exception of the subsequent examination of prevention, the remainder of this volume focuses on various aspects and instances of intervention. What follows is thus not an exhaustive account of the notion, but rather the conceptual foundation for subsequent analyses.

Many commentators would prefer to eliminate the "h" word, the modifier "humanitarian," before "intervention. Former colonies recall the disingenuous application of the term for purposes that were anything except humanitarian. And many observers do not want the high ground automatically occupied by those who claim a humanitarian justification for going to war without a serious scrutiny of the specific merits of the case or prejudging whether a particular intervention is defensible or not.

Such concerns are understandable and may serve some diplomatic or analytical purposes. However, "humanitarian intervention" is used throughout this volume because the term is employed in virtually all academic and policy literature. Semantics aside, truth in packaging requires an accurate short-hand description for military coercion to protect civilians.

It made no sense to insert either "so-called" throughout the text or to use scare quotes around the term. Human suffering and the need to provide humanitarian relief to affected populations are prominent in the support of publics and politicians who back the use of military force to support humanitarian objectives — and they almost always employ "humanitarian intervention" in their arguments. For many audiences, "humanitarian" thus retains great resonance.

It refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large scale loss of life including, of course, genocide , massive forced migrations, and widespread abuses of human rights. Acts that shock the conscience and elicit a basic humanitarian impulse remain politically powerful. The specific objectives are to explore the meaning and evolution of the concept, the implications of the United Nations UN Charter, and nonmilitary forms of intervention and to summarize the various dimensions of the contemporary intervention debate.

The actual meaning of the term "intervention" can be derived from the contexts in which it occurs, in addition to the purposes for which it is invoked. Actions do not amount to intervention if they are based on a genuine request from, or with the unqualified consent of, the target state. Consent, if it is to be valid in law, should emanate from the legal government of a sovereign state and be freely given. Forms of interference that fall short of coercion in the internal affairs of a state also do not amount to intervention.

In fact, a central purpose of foreign policy is to persuade other states, friend and foe alike, to enact changes in behaviour that are consistent with foreign policy objectives. Of course, wider definitions of intervention have always existed. In a world of asymmetrical power, economic activities and foreign direct investment are considered by some observers as types of "intervention.

Heightened state sensitivities to economic and cultural influences across borders have also meant even greater sensitivities to human rights pressures that occur without the assent of governments. Moreover, there are gray areas regarding "consent" — for economic as well as military measures.

Some observers note, for instance, that a request for military intervention may involve so much arm-twisting, including economic pressure from Washington-based financial institutions, as to effectively constitute coercion. Various terms have been coined in thinking about the problem of what amounts to coerced consent, including "coercive inducement.

As for many definitions, it may be more useful to think of consent as a continuum, rather than as an absolute concept. Notwithstanding these realities, the actual expression of consent is a critical dividing line in this volume, both legally and conceptually.

And given the legacy of colonialism, it is not surprising that it is the benchmark against which developing countries measure international action. Obviously the use of armed force against another state without its consent constitutes intervention, but so too does the use of such nonmilitary measures as political and economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and international criminal prosecution.

Intervention is a concept with a distinct character. Although intervention has most frequently been employed for the preservation of the vital interests — legitimately or illegitimately perceived — of intervening states, 3 there is also a long history of intervention justified on the grounds of grave human suffering. References to humanitarian intervention first began to appear in the international legal literature after Intervention was invoked against a state's abuse of its sovereignty by brutal and cruel treatment of those within its power, both nationals and nonnationals.

Such a state was regarded as having made itself liable to action by any state or states that were prepared to intervene. One writer, in , depicted humanitarian intervention as "the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from the treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.

Intervention was surrounded by controversy, however, and many looked, and continue to look, askance at the earliest cases of so-called humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that even when objectives were less objectionable, the paternalism of intervening powers — which were self-appointed custodians of morality and human conscience, as well as the guarantors of international order and security — undermined the credibility of the enterprise.

One noted legal authority concluded in that "no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in and But by the time the 12, European troops had been deployed, the violence was largely over, and after undertaking some relief activities the troops withdrew.

At the end of the 19th century, many legal commentators held that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention existed in customary international law, though a considerable number of scholars disagreed. Contemporary legal scholars disagree on the significance of these conclusions.

Some argue that the doctrine was clearly established in state practice prior to and that it is the parameters, not the existence, of the doctrine that are open to debate. Others reject this claim, noting the inconsistency of state practice, particularly in the 20th century, and the substantial number of scholars who had earlier rejected the proposition. What is clear is that this notion of intervention evolved substantially before the appearance of an international system with institutions responsible for maintaining international order and protecting human rights.

The first restrictions on recourse to war were developed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Later, the system crystallized into its current form, under the UN Charter. Since , the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states is prohibited by Article 2 4 , with exceptions granted for the collective use of force under Chapter VII and for individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack in Article Although the prohibition seems clear, questions about the legality of humanitarian intervention remained.

In , for example, an eminent legal scholar continued to argue that intervention is legally permissible when a state is guilty of cruelties against its nationals in a way that denied their fundamental human rights and shocked the conscience of humankind. The advent of the UN Charter fundamentally affected earlier interpretations of the legality of intervention. Not only did the Charter set out the circumstances under which intervention was permissible, it also changed the terms of debate by employing the term "the threat or use of force" instead of "intervention.

As "intervention" had been used, historically, as a synonym for the threat or use of force, the question was and remains: Did the Charter's prohibition on the unilateral threat or use of force prohibit intervention altogether, or was intervention subsumed by the system of the collective use of force? Even more controversial: Was there an interpretation of the term "intervention" that would place this concept outside the frame of the Charter's prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of a state?

Does the Charter prohibit the use of force without the authorization of the Security Council, even when exceptional circumstances arise? As the Charter explicitly permits the use of force in self-defence and enables the Security Council to authorize force to confront threats to international peace and security, a recurring aspect of debate has been the use of force to protect human rights.

The s were not the beginnings of the dispute. Various interpretations of the legality of humanitarian intervention were fiercely debated, particularly beginning in the late s. The ideological competition of the Cold War lent a particular character to interventions during that period. With much of the world aligned with one of the two superpowers, there was considerable pressure from both sides to intervene in both internal and international armed conflicts.

The deadlock in the Security Council and the existence of the veto also increased the likelihood that interventions would either not occur at all or be undertaken in the absence of a Council mandate. In fact, interventions during the Cold War were far more likely to be undertaken by a single state for example, the United States [US] in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and South Africa and Cuba in Angola , whether directly or by proxy, than they were to be multilateral.

On two occasions during this period, the International Court of Justice ICJ ruled on cases that involved assessing the legality of interventions for which humanitarian purposes had been declared: the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel and the US in Nicaragua. In both cases, the ICJ adhered to the position that the principle of nonintervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference and that international law requires territorial integrity to be respected.

The ICJ rejected intervention that impedes a state from conducting those matters that each state is permitted, by the principle of sovereignty, to decide freely — namely, its political, economic, social, and cultural system and the formulation of its foreign policy.

More specifically, in the case of Nicaragua vs. United States , the ICJ reiterated the attributes of humanitarian aid or assistance, that might also be applicable to military intervention for humanitarian purposes. If the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of a state, the ICJ took the view that it must be "limited to the purposes hallowed in practice, namely to prevent and alleviate human suffering, and to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being without discrimination to all in need" and that it be "linked as closely as possible under the circumstances to the UN Charter in order to further gain legitimacy.

The ICJ rejected the notion of the use of force to ensure the protection of human rights: "[W]here human rights are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring the respect for human rights as are provided for in the conventions themselves In any event Such a conclusion, however, does not appear to be definitive.

The protection of human rights by international conventions presupposes a stable and orderly system of monitoring and ensuring respect for human rights based on those conventions. Cases may arise where the existing arrangements are inappropriate for protecting human rights, owing to the nature and scale of the violations.

Furthermore, in extreme situations, where the Security Council is unable to act, political and moral imperatives may leave no choice but "to act outside the law. Further clarification of the meaning of intervention in the context of the Charter can be drawn from UN negotiations over the past decade. The end of the Cold War was seen by many as the rebirth of the UN, and it bore witness to an urge for intervention to sort out problems of civil strife.

Within the General Assembly, the tensions between intervention and state sovereignty initially focused on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The resolution maintained that humanitarian aid could and should be provided to affected populations in need of access to "essential" supplies. By implication, states were obliged to grant such access. A number of governments, however, objected on the grounds that NGOs might urge states to interfere in what the dissenters considered to be strictly domestic affairs.

Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the actual intervention that had preceded it, this resolution gives weight, first and foremost, to the consent of the state inhabited by severely affected populations. The most relevant section reads, "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the UN.

In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. Already in these debates, the views of developing and developed countries were polarized, and the ensuing negotiated text represented a delicate balance.

The result of this consensus is open to interpretation. Consent may reflect less the wishes of a government than severe international pressure, as was arguably the case with Indonesia over East Timor in Moreover, the government of a state requesting assistance may be disputed, as was arguably the case with the government-in-exile of Jean-Bertrand Aristide over Haiti in Behind the consensus is an assumption that the state concerned has a government with effective territorial control, allowing it to offer or refuse consent.

Where no such government exists, the requirement for consent, by definition, cannot be met, as was the case in Somalia in Furthermore, some observers point out that the phrase "in principle" may, in practice, mean that consent may be subordinate to the necessity to provide assistance in the face of an overwhelming human tragedy, or indeed that consent should come from citizens, rather than governments. The bulk of the contemporary policy and academic literature about intervention is concerned with the application of military force to pursue humanitarian objectives.

But the present analysis would be incomplete without also introducing nonmilitary intervention, both sanctions and criminal prosecution. International economic and political sanctions, as well as embargoes of various types, became widespread in the s. They are the main element of "nonmilitary" interventions designed to impose a course of conduct — including a change of policy — on a state, by banning or restricting that state's economic, military, or political relations. Sanctions are a punitive countermeasure against illegal acts, whether they be criminal for example, alleged acts of aggression or civil for example, alleged breaches of international obligations.

Economic sanctions include trade and commercial restrictions and sometimes embargoes on imports and exports, shipping, flights, investment, or assistance and the seizure of a state's assets abroad. Political sanctions include embargoes on arms, denial of military assistance and training, restraint on the means and extent of a state's level of armament, the nonrecognition of illegal acts perpetrated by a state, and the refusal of entry of political leaders into the territories of other states.

An analysis of the use of sanctions under the auspices of the UN Charter in the — and post-Cold War periods indicates three broad trends. First, there was a combination of unilateral and collective sanctions during the Cold War by individual states and by the UN, chiefly in the process of decolonization — specified in Charter Chapters XI—XIII and elsewhere 21 — against Portugal in relation to Angola and Mozambique before , Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, in , and South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia, 22 as well as its practice of apartheid between and Consequently, many "nonbinding" resolutions on sanctions were passed by the General Assembly during debates on decolonization.

Second, there is increasing use in the s of unilateral and collective sanctions in the context of diplomatic efforts to coerce state behaviour with respect to maintaining international peace and security under Chapter VII. Compliance with sanctions regimes is often voluntary at the outset in order to generate consensus and only later do they sometimes become mandatory under Chapter VII. The third discernible element is the use of sanctions as a means of intervening in aid of democracy, not only by the UN but more emphatically by the British Commonwealth, the European Union EU , the Organization of American States OAS , and other regional organizations.

The Haiti case is central because both the General Assembly and the OAS condemned the military coup that overthrew the elected government. The Security Council subsequently prohibited specified commercial passenger flights destined for Haiti and denied entry of the Haitian military and others to territories of UN member states. The Security Council also imposed embargoes on the supply of arms and petroleum to the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola, a rebel organization fighting the government of Angola in breach of the Lusaka Peace Agreement and UN-supervised elections.

The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 25 intervened on the authority of the Harare Declaration of , by imposing economic and political sanctions on military governments that had thwarted democracy or overthrown democratically elected governments in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Fiji.

Commonwealth membership of these states was also suspended. The Commonwealth is unusual among regional arrangements in its capacity and willingness to suspend or expel member states if they act in serious breach of the standards of human rights. But the sanctions imposed on Nigeria were mirrored by the EU, which restricted member states from granting visas to members of the Nigerian military government and security forces, alongside other measures. A central difficulty with sanctions is assessing their impact and effectiveness on the objectives for which they are imposed.

Research suggests little real impact over what is often a very long time. Sanctions tend, more often than not, to harm the economic and social well-being of the general population, rather than that of the political leadership against whom the coercive measures are imposed.

Yet, these exemptions cannot compensate for the massive economic dislocations, and the UN remains ill-equipped to oversee them. The dramatic suffering caused by economic sanctions — the plight of innocent civilians deteriorates with little discernable policy change from repressive regimes — suggests that sanctions and embargoes may not be an intervention tool of preference in the future.

Sanctions are a "blunt instrument" that inflict suffering on vulnerable groups, complicate the work of humanitarian agencies, cause long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations, and generate severe effects on neighbouring countries. Although he stopped short of rejecting sanctions, he urged reforms in their implementation.

Rather than gradually ratcheting up to more interventionist measures, it is plausible that an earlier resort to military force may be more "humane" than extended and extensive sanctions. After almost a half-century since the war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following the Second World War, the s have witnessed the renewed use of international criminal prosecution as a form of nonmilitary intervention.

Basic principles for prosecution under international criminal law were set out in the late s — that violations of the laws of war were subject to penal sanctions, that superiors' orders do not release an individual from responsibility, and that certain acts constitute crimes against humanity. Yet, almost no progress was made over the intervening 45 years. The s have witnessed a series of almost revolutionary changes. Not only are war criminals and human rights abusers occasionally being brought to account, but a series of transformations in international criminal law suggests that this form of intervention may become more routine.

The pursuit of indicted criminals is slow and time-consuming, and hence it is hardly an effective intervention instrument on the edge of the abyss of a humanitarian crisis in the same way that military intervention may be. In fact, a case can be made that international criminal prosecution may better be framed as an effective instrument for prevention through deterrence and eventually as a contribution to post-conflict reconciliation.

At the same time, the use of this tool effectively requires moving beyond consent, and the consequences are important for humanitarian action. The establishment of the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in and Rwanda in were major innovations. Despite initial scepticism and considerable criticism about the pace, both tribunals have convicted senior officials and made progress in setting the record straight.

They have also contributed to the development of international criminal jurisprudence. They have clearly established that criminal liability exists for war crimes during internal armed conflicts and that crimes against humanity extend beyond periods of armed conflict, and rape is now legally considered an aspect of genocide. Considerable erosion has also taken place in the rules relating to the immunity of leaders.

Until recently it was commonly accepted that leading officials including those retired could not be tried in courts in another country for acts committed in their own country while in office. More recently, the House of Lords — acting as Britain's highest court in the third Pinochet case — established a very strong precedent for no longer treating government officials as having absolute protection under the rules of the sovereign immunity of states.

This followed the new legal ground broken by the Arusha Tribunal, which convicted Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, the first head of government to be convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity. In March , Biljana Plavsic, the former president of the Republika Srpska, voluntarily surrendered herself to the Tribunal in The Hague after being indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide.

The indictment of a sitting head of state for war crimes, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic, for his direction of efforts in Kosovo is yet another precedent. Moving from the heads of state, some commentators saw as even more exceptional the conviction in spring of in Belgium of Rwandan nuns charged with complicity in the genocide.

These developments begin to form a pattern that suggests the emergence of universal jurisdiction for egregious human rights abuses. Kissinger, himself accused by some of being a "war criminal" for his role in the Vietnam War. Speaking for many who caution against this general trend, he argues that "[t]he danger lies in pushing the effort to extremes that risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments; historically, the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch-hunts.

While still waiting to enter into force, the Rome Statute will undoubtedly lead to the creation of a permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court ICC. The court will have jurisdiction over three crimes — genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes — and has provided definitions for each. As well as having a deterrent effect, indictments, some argue, may also serve as a disincentive to leaders who would be left with no reason to compromise.

The Rome Statute has also formalized in international law many of the precedents set out by the ad hoc tribunals. One of the more important aspects of the ICC is that it may answer partially the allegation that international justice is always of the victors' sort. The statute allows for criminal proceedings to be initiated, not only by states and the Security Council, but also by the ICC prosecutor independently. Intervention has long been one of the most controversial issues for diplomats, lawyers, and academics.

In the post-Cold War era, and particularly since the NATO intervention in Kosovo, state practice and scholarly analyses have sharpened the cutting edges of these long-standing controversies. To its detractors, it is an oxymoron, a pretext for military intervention often devoid of legal sanction, selectively deployed and achieving only ambiguous ends.

As some put it, there can be nothing humanitarian about a bomb. In broad brush strokes, two overarching positions have emerged about humanitarian intervention. Among the members of the trans-Atlantic community, there appears to be a general consensus on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in extreme circumstances, even in the absence of Security Council authorization. Although some of the five permanent members of the Security Council P-5 share this view, all agree that matters pertaining to the use of force should be in the hands of the great powers and thus they jealously guard their vetoes.

Among developing countries, the predominant view is a deep-seated scepticism toward humanitarian intervention because it seems to be yet another rationalization for unwanted interference. The dichotomy in views is exacerbated to the extent that the Third World has been relegated to the role of norm-takers, while developed countries act as norm-enforcers. The essence of the contemporary debate stems from two basic questions: Does a right of humanitarian intervention exist?

And if so, whose right is it? Are self-defence and Security Council-authorized enforcement under Chapter VII the only legitimate exceptions to the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force, or is there an independent right of humanitarian intervention based in either natural law or emerging state practice? Should the Security Council retain the legitimacy to make decisions on intervention, given that its composition, and the veto held by the P-5, is unrepresentative of the distribution of power and population in today's world?

Are there limitations on expanding the meaning of "international peace and security" to include humanitarian crises, or is the Security Council entitled to define the scope of its own mandate? Is the most pressing challenge to develop barriers to limit the possible abuse of the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, or is it to ensure that interventions widely believed necessary to stop mass atrocities are actually undertaken? Is sovereignty best conceived mainly as a barrier to unwarranted external interference and the foundation of a stable world order, or does it also imply a responsibility to both domestic populations and an international constituency?

Are the inconsistency and selectivity of international action to stop mass atrocities evidence of its illegitimacy as a result of hidden agendas and biases from interests and media coverage , or is it the result of choices that must be made when the capacity does not exist to intervene everywhere it is warranted? Will developing criteria for humanitarian intervention be more likely to stop illegitimate interventions, or simply provide a further rationale for inaction; and if developed, is it desirable that such criteria remain ad hoc, or should they be formalized through negotiations?

Does military intervention inevitably do more harm than good, or are the consequences generally positive, despite the inevitable failings and shortcomings? Is the priority during an intervention to provide the greatest protection possible to populations at risk, or is it to minimize casualties among the intervening armies, to ensure that fragile domestic support for interventions is maintained?

Does the long-term legitimacy of an intervention require the early withdrawal of forces to demonstrate a lack of ulterior motives, or does legitimacy in some cases require the establishment of protectorates even where these may facilitate secessionism? This is the starting point for Donald C. Daniel and Bradd C. It is worth noting that some analysts include both "solicited" that is, consensual and "unsolicited" military force in their definitions of intervention.

See Stowell, Intervention in International Law , pp. The International Court of Justice was provided an opportunity in the case of Nicaragua against the United States, but it declined to define the term. It engaged in a tautology of sorts by stating that humanitarian action is what the International Committee of the Red Cross does. The Oxford English Dictionary Oxford: Oxford University Press, is not of much help, by stating that humanitarian is "having regard to the interests of human-ity or mankind at large; relating to, or advocating, or practising humanity or human action.

See also Stephen J. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Despite appearing as an alternative to the use of force, they are often meant to "punish" a target. See also Robert A. Lopez, eds. Boulder: Westview Press, ; and Margaret P.

Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective , 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, In fact, the entire issue is devoted to this topic. Weiss, David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear, eds. Lopez, and Thomas G. However, the draft rules still required a nexus between where the crime was committed and the court in which the action was brought. More generally, moves to negotiate the draft Convention into existence failed. However, it does not affect serving heads of state or serving diplomats.

It remains an as yet untested possibility that the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols of on humanitarian law in armed conflict, which are regarded as being jus cogens , could provide sufficient authority for an armed intervention to enforce them. Common Article I of the Conventions states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.

The appeal of conflict prevention — as a policy, strategy, and paradigm — is enhanced by the widespread consensus that intervention is problematic and costly. Successful preventive measures could spare at-risk populations from the scourge of war, displacement, and death; save the international system the cost, risk, and political controversy of peace operations and direct humanitarian intervention; and shield the community of states from the "spill-over" and "spill-in" effects of intrastate wars, including refugee flows, arms trafficking, transnational criminality, and the spread of disease.

Preventive strategies are appealing both from the point of view of a liberal humanitarian ethos and that of a Realpolitik , national-security logic. Hence, it is treated as central to the sovereignty versus intervention debate and not as an afterthought. The focus here is on forestalling the human costs from violence and war, or, in the words of the Carnegie Commission, to "prevent extremely deadly conflicts.

Not surprisingly, conflict prevention as a general principle has been repeatedly endorsed in international fora, national-security documents, and academic analyses. Yet, in practice, conflict prevention has remained underdeveloped, undervalued, ephemeral, and largely elusive. A wealth of theoretical and applied research has been generated since the s, and a promising array of international, regional, and nongovernmental mechanisms for conflict prevention, focused particularly on intrastate conflict, were established or expanded in the s.

Moreover, when sustained measures have been undertaken, results have been mixed. There are only a few unambiguous examples of successful preventive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, while the catalogue of failed preventive action and missed opportunities is lengthy. Part of the problem has been the gap between rhetorical support and tangible commitments. As the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations points out, when it comes to improving UN preventive diplomatic and military capacity, there remains a "gap between verbal postures and financial and political support for prevention.

Virtually all observers of war and conflict concur that underdevelopment, poverty, and resource scarcity are among the root causes of conflict. For some observers, calls coming mainly from the affluent West for more robust rules of intervention ring somewhat hollow when set against the weakening commitment to economic development in poor countries. As to priorities, the main concern in policy making and scholarly debates in the West has overwhelmingly appeared to be reaction to humanitarian catastrophes, especially by military intervention, rather than on efforts to ensure that such disasters did not occur in the first place.

At the same time, the lack of certainty among developmentalists about what works and what does not gives pause as to the precise link between enhanced economic and social development and a reduction in violent conflict. Prevention is sometimes invoked as a solution to the sovereignty versus intervention dilemma.

According to this logic, if proactive measures could be taken to defuse tensions before they reach the point of armed violence, then the most nettlesome questions relating to the debate about international intervention versus state sovereignty could be finessed. Many measures in the "toolbox" depicted in Table 3. The "structural" preventive measures to address the root causes of poverty and many armed conflicts, for instance, work best with the full consent and participation of host governments.

Targeted development assistance, promotion of private investment, training and capacity building programmes for governments and civil society are relatively uncontroversial. The same could be said for such direct prevention efforts as offers of mediation or good offices. But other direct tools commonly cited in the literature are far more intrusive: sanctions, war crimes tribunals, human rights monitoring, arms embargoes, aid conditionality, preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces, and threat of force.

These arrows in the quiver of conflict prevention unquestionably move into the debate over intervention and state sovereignty. It is one of the reasons why many countries have become leery about the "continuum" of prevention. Poverty alleviation Economic growth and investment Democratic development Training and capacity building Security sector reform.

Good offices and special envoys Economic incentives Mediation and arbitration Preventive deployment. Diplomatic sanctions Economic sanction War crimes tribunals Arms embargoes Threat of military force. There are numerous criticisms of conflict prevention — that some violent conflicts are simply inevitable, that some actions can produce "compromises that kill," 4 that the entire concept has been "oversold," 5 or that in some instances it stands in the way of "just wars," wherein armed resistance against oppression is justified.

But even if one subscribes to these arguments, it still stands to reason that improving conflict prevention at every level — conceptually, operationally, and strategically — is urgent and essential. The following pages assess the "state of the art" of conflict prevention in theory and practice, with special attention to its place in the debate over intervention and state sovereignty. Conflict prevention is by no means new to international diplomacy; the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the UN were all established with the explicit intent to construct collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.

Indeed, Chapter VI of the UN Charter contains a catalogue of many consensual direct prevention devices that are linked to "the pacific settlement of disputes. Reasons for the ascendance of conflict prevention to the "front burner" of international diplomacy include the improved capacity for cooperative action in the UN Security Council after the end of the Cold War; alarm at the number of dangerous intrastate wars and collapsed states; sobering international experiences with belated intervention into complex political emergencies; revolutionary advances in information technology, which have made it more difficult for leaders to ignore violent crises in distant lands; and growing, organized public pressure on states and international organizations to intervene to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, and deadly conflicts.

The shift in emphasis toward prevention prominently manifested itself in , when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released An Agenda for Peace in response to the Security Council's request for recommendations to improve the UN's capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building.

This document identified preventive diplomacy as "the most desirable and efficient" option for managing conflicts and identified several essential capacities on the part of the international community — confidence-building measures, early-warning and fact-finding capabilities, and rapid preventive deployment capacity. The declining enthusiasm for UN peace operations in the Supplement published only three years later by the UN made prevention seem even more attractive.

In recent years, the UN has continually underscored the importance of conflict prevention. Between and , initial measures were undertaken toward internal restructuring to improve its preventive capacities, but UN resources dedicated to preventive diplomacy remain dwarfed by the resources dedicated to efforts after wars and especially to peacekeeping.

In , Norway established a Fund for Preventive Action for use by the Secretary-General to support the work of special envoys and special representatives in emerging conflicts. The UN may not always be the most appropriate instrument. Under his tutelage, the quartet explored the potential of their abilities without restriction and discovered new aspects of their powers.

Unfortunately, these exercises also proved to be very dangerous, with one "training session" almost getting the children killed after No-Girl swapped the group's minds into each other's bodies. When the group's friend Scout tried to inform Wolfsbane of the Shadow King's actions, he possesses Wolfsbane and murdered Scout during the Hellfire Gala.

Although Scout is saved by Krakoa's resurrection protocol, the experience convinces the children that the Shadow King is not as trustworthy as they had initially believed. Once the truth is revealed, the senior New Mutants decide to confront the Shadow King.

As they approach the Shadow King's mountain lair, the team is trapped in a hallucination that pits them against a horde of their greatest enemies, from the Sentinels to the Brood. After a grueling battle, the vision changes to that of a Cairo marketplace, and the Shadow King sits the group down to explain why he's taken such an interest in Krakoa's young mutants.

Having lived for millennia by jumping into different bodies, the Shadow King has seen the rise and fall of entire civilizations, and he doesn't believe that Krakoa will fair much better. Having witnessed the constant struggle for survival that the mutants have faced firsthand through his conflict with the X-Men, the Shadow King not only believes that Krakoa is doomed to fail, but that the "illusion" of peace will ultimately ensure its extinction once the conflict with humanity and its technology inevitably resumes.

By encouraging the next generation of mutants to fully embrace their powers, the Shadow King believes he is saving them from Xavier's delusions of peace.

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The response or non-response of companies then becomes part of the evaluation process. When companies in the industry don't treat their clients honestly, the Forex Peace Army takes steps to warn traders. Are there any specific practices or strategies you would recommend to regulated or conversely unregulated brokers?

First, take care of your clients, then educate and inform them of your policies. Also never pressure them to deposit more than they are comfortable with. Next, never make promises your company cannot keep. Finally be active in public media and on our site. If you get negative reviews — add comments to them and address the issues.

If we get complaints about your company we will invite you to explain your side of the story — make sure you are active and responsive. We had cases when company reps were really unprofessional and unethical or simply ignored all our invitations to explain the matter.

We had no other choice but to put a warning on their review page. And only after this company management would find out there were complaints… So make sure you have registered company rep within our page — in case we get any complaints we will contact the rep immediately. For unregulated brokers, get regulated. What is your opinion surrounding the effectiveness and legitimacy of specific worldwide regulators, i.

CySEC is one of the key watchdog authorities for brokerages in Europe, whose financial regulations and operations comply with the European MiFID financial harmonization law. Founded in , CySEC is instrumental in providing licensing and registration for forex brokers and previously binary options providers. CySEC is responsible for a variety of different functions, which includes the supervision and control of the Cyprus Stock Exchange as well as transactions executed in the Stock Exchange, its listed companies, brokers and brokerage firms.

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